Rules 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: A New   Strict in Context  Approach by Goldman, Edith A
Boston College Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 4 Symposium On The Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act Of 1980
Article 5
5-1-1981
Rules 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: A New " Strict in Context" Approach
Edith A. Goldman
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edith A. Goldman, Rules 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: A New " Strict in Context" Approach, 22 B.C.L. Rev. 815 (1981),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol22/iss4/5
RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
A NEW "STRICT IN CONTEXT" APPROACH
Guilty pleas and the often associated plea bargains are a dominant force in
the federal courts today.' The great majority of federal defendants plead guilty
rather than going to trial.' Indeed, it is doubtful that the federal court system
could function today without guilty pleas, given the requirements imposed by
the Speedy Trial Act. 3 Not only does the criminal justice system now rely on
guilty pleas for efficient administration,* it also may depend on these pleas to
insure a more effective and just system by guaranteeing prompt correctional
measures, 6 helping to preserve a true presumption of innocence, 6 and
facilitating prosecution of more serious offenders.'
' Sec Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977). "Whatever might be the situation in
an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are impor-
tant components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can
benefit all concerned." Id. at 71. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Court
called plea bargaining "an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly ad-
ministered, it is to be encouraged." Id. at 260.
For the twelve month period ending ,June 30, 1980, 80.8% of federal convictions
(63.2% of defendants) occurred on pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 97, Tables 44 and
45 at 98, Table D-4 at A-75. For the period ending June 30, 1979, 82.9% of federal convictions
(66.3% of defendants) occurred on pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. 1979 ANNUAL. REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 107, Table 55 at
108, Table D-4 at A-69.
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified at 18 U.S.C. S
3161 (1976)). The Act requires that trials of federal defendants be started within 70 days of the fil-
ing of the information or indictment or of an appearance before a judicial officer of the court in
which a charge is pending, whichever occurs last. This time limit is subject to certain designated
periods which may be excluded from the computation. Id. at 5 3161(c).
' See, e.g., Notes of Advisory Committee on 1975 Amendments to Rules, FED. R.
GRIM. P. 11, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. 1417, 1419 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Advisory
Committee Notes]; U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OE JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURT'S 10 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Task Force
Report]; Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 865, 881-82 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining]. For another view, see
a study of Connecticut's criminal courts which rejects the theory that plea bargaining is a func-
tion °Cease overload. M. H EUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978). This study points out " . . . that variations in case
pressure do not directly and appreciably affect trial rates — historically, low volume courts have
not tried significantly more cases, and recent decreases in volume have not led to markedly
greater rates of trial." Id. at 31. Instead, the author views plea bargaining as inextricably bound
to trial courts and an inevitable practice in the local criminal court. Id. at 32, 157, 162.
1975 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 1419; See also Santobello v. United
States, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
6 Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 10; ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, p. 299 (1974).
1975 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 1419; Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra
note 4, at 879 (1964).
815
816	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 fVol. 22:815
In accepting the reality of the plea bargaining system, both the courts and
Congress have had to address occasionally conflicting concerns. In order to
safeguard defendants' constitutional rights in a consistent manner, the plea
procedure must be sufficiently detailed and complete to insure that the plea is
informed and voluntary, and the procedure must be routinely followed.°
Nevertheless, the judicial system must not be undUly burdened by frivolous ap-
peals and reversed convictions arising from claims of noncompliance with these
procedures. Thus, the finality and efficiency of the plea procedure must be
preserved while defendants' rights are uniformly and routinely protected.
Congress' concern with insuring that guilty pleas are informed and volun-
tary is represented by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which prescribes the procedures for accepting guilty pleas in the federal
courts. 9
 This rule has presented the courts with a two-pronged issue — first,
what constitutes compliance with the rule, and second, whether failure to com-
ply with it should result in per se reversal of a conviction. The original version of
the rule required only that the trial judge determine that the plea was entered
into voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge.") Rule 11
was amended in 1966 to require, in addition, that the defendant be addressed
personally, that the defendant understand the consequences of the plea, and
that the court be satisfied that a factual basis for the plea exists."
The circuit courts of appeal took a variety of positions on the effect of non-
compliance with both the original and amended versions of the rule. Most cir-
cuits held that when the district court did not fully comply with Rule 11, the
case had to be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, if such a determination could not be
made from the record." Other circuits shifted the burden to the government to
prove that the plea was entered into voluntarily with an understanding of the
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
A plea of guilty . 	 . is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive.
More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.
Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts arc careful that a
plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and
with full understanding of the consequences.
Id. at 223.
9 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
1 ° The original Rule 11 provided in full:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent of the court, nolo
contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty and shall not accept the
plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understand-
ing of the nature of the charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court
refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the
court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, 327 U.S, 842 (1946).
" Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, 383 U.S. 1097 (1966). For the full text of the rule, see note 27
infra.
12
 Kennedy v. United States, 397 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1018
(1969); United States v. Del Piano, 386 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. dened, 392 U.S. 936 (1968);
Stephens v. United States, 376 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 881 (1967);
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charge." Finally, one circuit held that if the district court did not fully comply
with Rule 11, the guilty plea had to be set aside and the defendant given an op-
portunity to plead again."
In McCarthy u. United States ,i 5 the Supreme Court finally addressed itself to
the dispute that existed among the circuits over the remedy for noncompliance
with the rule.' 6 The McCarthy Court held that a defendant is entitled to have his
conviction vacated and to plead again if a United States district court accepts
his guilty plea without fully adhering to the procedure provided for in Rule
11." In adopting a mechanical rule of reversal and rejecting the case-by-case
evidentiary approach, the McCarthy Court opted for a process which, it was
hoped, would insure consistent protection of defendants' rights."' This pro-
cedure was also intended to reduce the long term burden on the judicial
system, notwithstanding the short term interference with the finality of the plea
procedure which would result from a rule of automatic reversa1. 19
After McCarthy, the remedy for noncompliance with Rule 11 remained
clear until the rule was amended again in 1975. 20 This amendment significant-
ly expanded the rule by prescribing the advice that a court must give in order to
insure that a defendant makes an informed plea. 21 This version of the rule ex-
plicitly lists the subjects that a court must address, including the constitutional
rights being waived by the defendant in making his plea. 22
As a result of the 1975 amendment, the circuit courts have again
developed different approaches to deal with the consequences of non-
compliance with the rule. In addition, they have adopted varying interpreta-
tions of what constitutes compliance with the revised version of the rule. The
central point of disagreement among the circuits is whether the strict McCarthy
rule applies with the same force to the detailed and lengthy amended Rule 11
as it did to the 1966 version of the rule. Some courts have held that there must
be literal compliance with amended Rule 11 and that if a plea is accepted
Brochaw v. United States, 368 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967); Bone v.
United States, 351 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957);
United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1954).
13 Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967), aff'd on other grounds, 394
U.S. 831 (1969) (Court refused to apply McCarthy retroactively); Rimanich v. United States, 357
F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1966).
14 Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965).
394 U.S. 459 (1969).
' 6 The Court made this decision in its supervisory role over the federal courts rather
than based on any constitutional issues. The Court did discuss, however, the waiver of constitu-
tional rights inherent in a guilty plea and the potential for violation of due process. Id. at 464.
17 Id. at 463-64.
10 Id. at 471-72.
19 Id. at 472.
20 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64,
89 Stat. 371 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 5 3771 (1976)). For a brief description of the history of rule 11
and a complete description of the 1975 changes, see Note, Revised Federal Rule II: Tighter Guidelines
for Pleas in Criminal Cases, 44 FORDUAM L. REV. 1010 (1976).
21 FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(c).
22 Id.
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without strict adherence to the rule, the conviction must be reversed and the
defendant allowed to plead again." Other courts have determined that
ritualistic compliance with all of Rule 11 is unnecessary. Instead, these courts
have required only substantial compliance with Rule 11, such that the core
concerns of the pre-McCarthy rule are addressed. 24
 Specifically, under this view,
the judge must address the defendant personally and determine that the plea is
voluntary and informed and that the defendant has knowledge of the conse-
quences of the plea. If the record does not establish this substantial compliance,
the guilty plea will be set aside. Furthering the confusion created by these dif-
ferent standards, many circuits do not adhere to the standards they adopt.
Often, the courts have narrowed or broadened their definition of compliance to
fit the circumstances of a case and to achieve the desired result." The Supreme
Court has not yet addressed the dispute among the circuit courts as to whether,
on direct appeal, the McCarthy standard extends to revised Rule 11."
This note will examine the problems inherent in each of the approaches
taken by the courts. First, the note will present United States v. McCarthy and
summarize the 1975 amendments. Next, it will present the different standards
that have been advanced by the circuits for review of judicial compliance with
Rule 11, as amended in 1975. Included will be a discussion of some representa-
tive cases and an analysis of the extent to which the results comport with the
circuit's announced standard. This note then will consider the policy issues
that shape the legal question, and will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
the existing standards. This analysis will be followed by a discussion of a pro-
posed change to the rule — a change which is intended to resolve this issue. It
will be submitted that none of the approaches utilized or proposed deals ade-
quately with the problem. Only strict adherence to Rule 11 comports with the
23
 United States v. Del Prete, 567 F. 2d 928 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. journet,
544 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Boone, 543 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1976). The issue
has not yet been settled in the Third Circuit. In United States v. Carter, 619 F.2d 293 (3d Cii-.
1980), however, the court suggested that continued deviations from Rule 11 which result in ap-
peals might require the adoption of a standard of strict compliance with automatic reversal for
each violation of the rule.
24
 United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904
(1980); United States v. Lambros, 544 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977).
It is not entirely clear which approach the Seventh Circuit has adopted. The language in. United
States v. Fels, 599 F.2d 142, 149 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979) indicates that the court expects strict com-
pliance with the rule. In United States v. Gray, 611 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 911 (1980), however, the court determined that a literal reading of Rule 11 would exalt
forM over substance and that therefore, on the facts of that case, the rule had not been violated.
Id. at 202.
25
 Thus, in United States v. Gray, 611 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1979), it is not clear whether
this court, eager not to vacate the plea on the facts of this case, stretched the reading of Rule 11 as
far as possible or whether they actually adopted a substantial compliance standard. See also
United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Michaelson, 552 F.2d 472
(2d Cir. 1977).
26
 The Court has ruled that a conviction based upon a guilty plea is not subject to col-
lateral attack when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements of Rule I 1.
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979).
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legislative intent in the passage of the 1975 amendments, the policy served by
the rule, and the mandates of the Supreme Court decisions in the area. Never-
theless, adopting an unwavering strict compliance, automatic reversal stand-
ard leads to practical problems in the application of the standard. This note will
therefore propose a new standard which follows the intent of the rule and the
McCarthy decision and which can be applied consistently without producing
unreasonable results. This standard can be used currently by the appellate
courts in reviewing judicial compliance with the rule and in the future can be
incorporated as a standard into Rule 11.
I. BACKGROUND: MCCARTHY AND THE REVISIONS TO RULE 11
A. McCarthy v. United States
In order to understand the problem currently confronting the courts, it is
necessary first to examine how the McCarthy Court construed Rule 11 and the
1966 amendments, 27 and then to explore the reasons for and scope of the 1975
amendments. In McCarthy, the trial judge failed to inquire personally if the
defendant understood the nature of the charge against him. 28 The McCarthy
Court considered whether this failure violated the 1966 version of Rule 11 and
what the effect of noncompliance with the rule should be. Rule 11 provided
that the trial judge was to address the defendant personally and determine that
the plea was made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.
The rule further provided that the trial court was to decide whether a factual
basis existed for the plea.
In determining if the judge complied with Rule 11, the McCarthy Court in-
itially identified the two purposes of the rule. The Court found that one pur-
pose was to help the district court judge in making the constitutionally required
determination that the defendant's plea was voluntary. 29 The Court noted that
inherent in the voluntariness requirement is a need for the plea to be informed
and for the defendant to understand the relation of the law to the facts. 3° The
27 The text of the rule, with the 1966 amendments in italics, is as follows:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent of the court, nolo
contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept
such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the
court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear,
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea
of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, 383 U.S. 1097 (1966).
28 See 394 U.S. at 461 -63:
29 Id, at 465.
'° Id. at 466. Although the Court did not hold that compliance with Rule 11 is constitu-
tionally required, the court reasoned that the purposes of the rule arise from the waiver of con-
stitutional rights inherent in a guilty plea. Id. In order •to have a valid waiver of a defendant's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront
his accusers, due process requires that the waiver be an intentional relinquishment of abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
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second purpose of the rule, according to the Court, was to insure that a com-
plete record be made of the factors related to the voluntariness determination,
thus enabling the courts to dispose quickly of any collateral attacks on the
validity of guilty pleas. 3 '
The McCarthy Court noted that the requirements of Rule 11 provide the
procedural tools necessary to accomplish the purposes of the rule. According to
the Court, when the trial judge personally addresses the defendant regarding
the voluntariness and consequences of his plea and his understanding of the
nature of the charge, he exposes the defendant's state of mind on the record."
This not only facilitates the district judge's determination of voluntariness, it
also eases disposition of subsequent collateral attacks on voluntariness." Thus,
the Court concluded that the purposes of the rule are undermined when the
district court judge makes assumptions about the defendant's understanding of
the charges not based on responses to his inquiries on the record. 34 In order for
the district judge to have complied with Rule 11, the Court maintained that he
must have inquired whether the defendant understood the nature of the
charge." Compliance, according to the Court, demands on the record
responses to the judge's inquiries without regard to any inferences of the judge.
Having decided that Rule 11 had not been complied with in this case, the
McCarthy Court further considered what effect this noncompliance should have.
Looking again to the two purposes of the rule, the Court determined that there
is no substitute for demonstrating that a plea is informed and voluntary at the
time it is entered." In the Court's view, any subsequent attempt to make this
determination would be highly subjective," and any attempt to determine if
the defendant's plea would otherwise have been different is highly
speculative." The Court concluded that "prejudice inheres in a failure to com-
ply with Rule 11, for noncompliance deprives the defendant of the Rule's pro-
cedural safeguards that are designed to facilitate a more accurate determina-
tion of the voluntariness of his plea." 39
 For these reasons, the McCarthy Court
3 ' Id. at 465.
32 Id. at 467.
33 Id .
'4 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 470.
" Id: at 469.
38 Id. at 471.
" Id. at 471-72. The Court continued:
Our holding that a defendant whose plea has been accepted in violation of Rule 11
should be afforded the opportunity to plead anew not only will insure that every
accused is afforded those procedural safeguards, but also will help reduce the great
waste of judicial resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea
convictions that are encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of, when the
original record is inadequate. It is, therefore, not too much to require that, before
sentencing defendants to years of imprisonment, district judges take the few
minutes necessary to inform them of their rights and to determine whether they
understand the action they are taking.
Id. at 472.
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held that noncompliance with Rule 11 must result in reversal of the conviction
and an opportunity to plead anew.
B. 1975 Amendment to Rule 11
The decision in McCarthy construed the 1966 version of Rule 11. In order
to comprehend the problem currently confronting the circuit courts, it is
necessary to examine the rule as it now exists as well as the reasons for the ex-
tensive changes which were made in 1975. Prior to the 1975 amendment, Rule
11 was very brief. In one sentence the rule set out the requirements that the
court address the defendant personally and determine that the plea is in-
formed, voluntary, and made with knowledge of the consequences." As the
following explication of the 1975 amendment will indicate, all of Rule 11(c)
and (d) is now devoted to the procedures necessary to fulfill these re-
quirements.'"
Subsection c(1), 42 for example, replaced the vague language of "conse-
quences of the plea" with a requirement that the defendant be informed of the
maximum penalty as well as any mandatory minimum. This subsection re-
tained the requirement present in the old rule that the defendant be informed
of the nature of the charge. In addition, subsections c(2), (3), and (4) specify
4° See text of rule at note 27 supra.
41 FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(c) and (d) provide in full:
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
court must address the defendant personally fn open court and inform him of, and
determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory
minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty
provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right
to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him
and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that. plea if it has
already been made, and he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial
has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to in-
criminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nob contendere he waives the
right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him ques-
tions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these ques-
tions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers
may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
(d) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open
court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats
or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to
whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from
prior discussions between the attorney for the government and the defendant or his
attorney.
42 See text of rule at note 41 supra.
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the constitutional rights that the defendant waives by pleading guilty or nolo
contendere. Under these portions of the amended rule, the judge must per-
sonally inform the defendant and determine that he understands that he has
(1) the right to be represented by an attorney — appointed, if necessary — at
each stage of the proceedings," (2) the right to plead not guilty and continue to
so plead," (3) the right to trial by jury and assistance of counsel at that trial,"
(4) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him," and (5) the
right not to be forced to incriminate himself.'" The amended rule then provides
that the defendant must be told that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, he
waives the right to a trial of any kind." The provisions in subsections c(2), (3),
and (4) were added to satisfy the mandate of Boykin v. Alabama49
 that the de-
fendant be apprised of the rights he is waiving in pleading guilty. 5° The Boykin
Court held that the defendant was denied due process in an Alabama court
when his guilty plea was accepted with no indication on the record that his plea
was informed and voluntary. According to the Boykin Court, the waivers of
constitutional rights to confront one's accusers, to trial by jury, and the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination are inherent in a guilty plea. 5 t
Thus, waiver of these rights cannot be presumed from a silent record. 52
While subsections c(1) through c(4) clarified the formerly vague re-
quirements of the rule and of Boykin, subsection c(5) added a totally new re-
quirement to the rule. This subsection demands that the defendant be advised
that he may be asked questions about the offense to which he is pleading, and
that he may be subject to a perjury charge for statements made, under oath, in
connection with a plea during the plea proceeding. This subsection was
adopted because Congress believed it was only fair to provide such a
warning."
In addition to the extensive requirements located in subsection 1 1(c),
subsections (d), (f), and (g) also contain relevant portions of the rule. Like
former Rule 1 1 , subsection (d) requires that the judge address the defendant
personally and determine that the plea is voluntary. Additionally, subsection
(d) specifies that the judge ask whether the plea results from a plea agreement''' .
The requirement, now in 1 1(f), that the judge determine that there is a factual
" FED. R. GRIM: P. 11(c)(2).
44
 Id. 11(c)(3).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. MOM.
49
 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
" 1975 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 1418; Notes of Committee on the
Judiciary, H.R. REP. NO. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 679 [hereinafter cited without parallel citation as HOUSE REPORT]
51
 395 U.S. at 243.
57 Id.
53 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 679.
54 See text of rule at note 41 supra.
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basis for the plea remains unchanged from the old rule." Finally, a require-
ment was added in 11(g) for a verbatim record of the guilty plea proceeding to
be kept."
As a result of the extensive changes to the rule, significant questions have
arisen as to whether the judge must comply strictly with every word of the
rule's amended version and whether the per se reversal rule of McCarthy applies
to noncompliance with the revised rule. Most of the circuit courts of appeal
have considered these questions. The next section will describe the different ap-
proaches developed by the circuit courts.
II. STANDARDS OF COMPLIANCE AND REVIEW
The circuit courts have addressed the issue of compliance with the revised
rule in a variety of ways. Some courts have adopted a standard which requires
strict adherence to Rule 11 and automatic reversal for a failure to comply."
This approach and its problems will be illustrated in the following section
through a consideration of Second Circuit cases.
Other circuits, believing that Rule 11 is too detailed and complex to man-
date automatic reversal for each technical failure to comply with the rule, have
chosen less strict standards." Some of these courts have held that as long as
there has been "substantial compliance" with Rule 11, the conviction will be
affirmed. Where "substantial compliance" has not been achieved, the plea will
be vacated." Most of the "substantial compliance" courts, however, have not
carefully defined what constitutes substantial compliance with the rule. 6° Fur-
" FED R. CRIM. P. 11(f) provides: "Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding
the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such a plea without
making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea."
56 FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(g) provides: "Record of Proceedings. A verbatim record of the
proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there is a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, the record shall include, without limitation, the court's advice to the defendant,
the inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea including any plea agreement, and the inquiry into
the accuracy of a guilty plea."
" See note 23 supra.
" See note 24 supra.
" United States v. Lambros, 544 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1976); cf. United States v. Gray,
611 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1979) (As discussed in note 24 supra, the opinion in Gray implies a
"substantial compliance" approach although the Seventh Circuit has not clearly articulated
which standard it is adopting.)
" The Eighth Circuit, for example, never clearly defined the standard used. It appears
that its approach is to require the district court to employ procedures sufficient to determine that
the defendant understands the charges and the consequences of the plea and that the plea is truly
voluntary. United States v. Cammisano, 599 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 1979). Ritualistic com-
pliance with Rule 11 is unnecessary, but a plea taken without substantial compliance with the
rule will be reversed. Id. The line between complying with the substance of a rule and literal re-
quirements of a rule is not always clear. This is best exemplified by United States v. Lambros,
544 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1976). In that case, the prosecutor, rather than the judge, explained the
nature of the offense and the rights waived and questioned the defendant about the voluntary and
informed nature of the plea. Id. at 964. Following this, the district judge briefly questioned the
defendant. Id. The appellate court held that there was substantial compliance with Rule 11
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thermore, they often do not distinguish between the question of what con-
stitutes compliance with Rule 11 and the question of what standard of review
will be applied in a noncompliance situation. As a result, it is sometimes
unclear what the basis is for a court's refusal to vacate a plea — whether it con-
siders Rule 11 to have been complied with by the judge or whether it believes
that the judge has not fully complied with the rule but refuses to vacate the plea
because it is adopting a harmless error standard and considers the error to be
harmless. 61
One circuit has articulated more clearly the standard of less than strict
compliance and automatic reversal. The Fifth Circuit requires automatic
reversal only if the core concerns of the pre-McCarthy rule are not addressed. 62
In essence, this is a more explicit articulation of a "substantial compliance"
rule. The Fifth Circuit will be used to illustrate the "substantial compliance"
approach and its problems. The Fifth Circuit cases and the problems in its ap-
proach will be described following the discussion of the Second Circuit.
A. Second Circuit: Strict Compliance and Automatic Reversal
In United States v. Journet, 63
 the Second Circuit adopted a strict compliance
standard and held that unless the defendant is informed of each element
enumerated in Rule 1 1 , the plea must be vacated. The defendant in Journet ex-
pressly waived his right to a jury trial, his right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him, and his right to a presumption of innocence." The trial
court judge also established the voluntariness of the plea and the factual basis
for the plea. Further, he informed the defendant of the minimum and max-
because the district court by its personal questioning had adopted the record made by the pros-
ecutor. Id. at 966. Thus, the court refused to elevate form over substance. By viewing the re-
quirement that the judge address the defendant as purely an issue of form, however, the court ig-
nored the voluntariness issues raised by allowing the prosecutor to function in this role. In United
States v. Hart, 566 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit rejected such a procedure stressing
that an atmosphere of subtle coercion is created by allowing the prosecutor to address the defend-
ant. Id. at 978.
61 See, e.g. , United States v. Gray, 611 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lam-
bras, 544 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1976). In Lambros, the court stated that the defendant pointed "to no
way in which he was misled or prejudiced by the Rule 11 proceedings." Id. at 965. See note 60
sup-a. It is not clear from this statement whether the court determined that the judge had substan-
tially complied with Rule 11 in accepting and not personally addressing the statements made by
the prosecutor or whether there was error in complying with the rule but the court considered the
error to be harmless. It is possible that the courts obfuscate the distinction between a standard of
substantial compliance and a harmless error standard of review because they believe that McCar-
thy compels automatic reversal as long as there is not substantial compliance with the rule. The
McCarthy rule, according to this view, would preclude use of a harmless error standard because it
does not relate to the degree of compliance with the rule but instead is a standard of review which
depends on the real effect of the noncompliance on the defendant. Thus, even though a court
considers any prejudice there may be to the defendant, it may not want to indicate that it is using
a harmless error standard.
62 See text and notes at notes 97-99 infra.
63 544 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1976).
64 Id. at 634.
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imum sentences." The judge, however, failed to inform the defendant explicit-
ly that the maximum possible penalty included possible life-time parole, and
that if he went to trial, he would have the right to assistance of counsel. 66 In ad-
dition, the judge did not warn the defendant that (1) by pleading guilty he was
waiving his right' against self incrimination, (2) there would be no further trial
of any kind, and (3) answers to the court, under oath, could be used against
him later in a prosecution for perjury. 67
The Journet court held that the guilty plea had to be vacated because of the
district court's failure to comply with Rule 11(c). 68 The court found it inade-
quate to establish that the plea was voluntary and informed in light of all the
surrounding circumstances." Instead, the Journet court held that the language
of Rule 11 must be followed strictly, and that the "district court judge must
personally inform the defendant of each and every right and other matter set
out in Rule 11. Otherwise the plea must be treated as a nullity." The court
reasoned that Congress clearly had mandated such strict adherence in adopting
the 1975 amendment to the rule." By using the language "the court must ad-
dress the defendant personally . . " [emphasis added], 72 the Journet court
concluded that Congress, in very distinct language, had mandated the pro-
cedure to be followed." Furthermore, the court maintained, the legislative
history evidences Congress' purpose of codifying the advice required by Boykin
v. Alabama and demonstrates that the choice of specific language was
deliberate. 74
 Based on this reasoning, theJournet court rejected a harmless error
standard," claiming that such a standard would bypass the specific procedure
required by Rule 11 and thus would defeat Congress' intent of insuring com-
pliance with Boykin. 76
Two Second Circuit cases decided after Journet underscore the problems
courts have encountered in adhering to standards of strict compliance once
they have been adopted. In United States v, Michaelson" and United States v.
Saft, 78
 the defendants' guilty pleas were not vacated even though there ap-
peared to be noncompliance with Rule 11.
In Michaelson, the defendant was not advised, as demanded by Rule
63 Id.
66 Id. at 636.
67
 Id. at 636-37.
69 Id. at 636.
69 Id.
7° Id.
7 Id. at 635-36.
72 FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(c).
73
 544 F.2d at 635.
74
 544 F.2d at 635-36. For a discussion of how the legislative history demonstrates that
the choice of mandatory language was deliberate see text and notes at notes 121-36 infra.
" For a definition of harmless error, see text of FED, R. GRIM. P 52(a) at note 158 infra.
76
 544 F.2d at 636.
77 552 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1-977).
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1 1(c)(3), that he could not be compelled to incriminate himself." Nevertheless,
carving out an exception to its rule of automatic reversal, the Michaelson court
held that vacating the defendant's guilty plea "would be a needlessly rigid
reading of amended Rule 11 and ofijournet." 8° In evaluating the district court's
failure to inform the defendant of his right not to incriminate himself, the court
concluded that Michaelson clearly did not plead guilty because he believed that
he would be compelled to testify against himself." In considering that the omis-
sion was not prejudicial, the court appears to have applied a harmless error
standard even though the opinion concluded with the statement that "[olur
decision therefore is not to be interpreted as overruling Journet in any
respect. "82
In United States v. Safi, the Second Circuit again refused to reverse a con-
viction based on a guilty plea. Here, however, the court held that there was
compliance with Rule 11 8 ' even though, on the surface, there was not literal
adherence to the entire rule. In Saft, the trial court judge failed to inform the
defendant, as required by 1 1 (c)(3), that he would have the right to counsel if he
went to trial." The circuit court reasoned that even though the defendant was
not specifically apprised of his right to counsel if he went to trial, as required by
1 1(c)(3), it would defy reality and contradict the defendant's own affidavit to
say that he did not know his rights." Thus, despite the omission, the court con-
" 558 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1977).
79
 552 F.2d at 476. Additionally, the defendant was not advised, as required by
11(c)(5), that if he answered questions posed by the court, his statement could later be used
against him in a prosecution on a perjury charge. Id. The court reasonably concluded that since
the district courts in the Second Circuit do not place the defendant under oath during question-
ing, the failure to give this warning was not reversible error. Id. at 477.
a° Id.
" Id. The Court gave two reasons for reaching this conclusion. First, at the time of
sentencing, Michaelson's attorney indicated that the defendant had intended to testify at trial in
order to establish his defense of entrapment. Id. Second, since the defendant was represented by
competent counsel who had already begun to participate in the trial, the court considered it
"highly unlikely" that the lawyer would not have advised the defendant of the right not to in-
criminate himself. Id.
82 Id. at 477-78. The court tried to justify its failure to follow the strict reading of Rule
11 dictated in ,Journet by noting that the plea was taken after the trial had started and before the
decision in journet. Id. at 477.
" 558 F.2d at 1079.
84 id. at 1080. Additionally, the defendant contended that he was not sufficiently in-
formed of the nature of the charge to which he was pleading because the judge did not provide the
equivalent of a jury charge. Id. at 1079. The court ruled that to comply with the Rule 11(c)(1) re-
quirement that the defendant be informed of the nature of the charge, it is enough for the indict-
ment to be read, for the defendant to indicate that he understands, and for a judge to determine
that he understood. Id. In the Safe court's view, the equivalent of a jury charge is unnecessary
where the defendant has read the indictment and conferred with counsel, and where charges are
easily understood by a person with the defendant's experience, education and intelligence. Id.
The court relied on legislative history to support its interpretation. Id. at 1079-80. The Advisory
Committee Notes indicate that the method for determining the defendant's understanding of the
nature of the charge will vary depending on the complexity of the charges and the.characteristics
of the defendant. 1975 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 1418.
" 558 F.2d at 1080.
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eluded that there had been compliance with Rule 11. 86 The Saft court then was
able to distinguish Journet by noting that inJournet, the district court concededly
failed to comply with several elements of the rule."
It is arguable that the Saft court in fact applied a harmless error standard,
although it claimed to be using theJournet standard which rejected harmless er-
ror. In considering the posture of the case at the time of the plea and the reality
that the defendant probably knew his rights, the court deviated from a standard
based strictly on the requirements of the rule. In its place, the Saft court
established a rule that determines from external circumstances whether the
violation of the rule is prejudicial.
The Michaelson and Saft decisions typify the problems that courts have had
to address after adopting a standard of strict compliance and automatic rever-
sal for noncompliance with Rule 1 1 . 88 These courts reason that the legislative
history," the language of the rule, 9° the McCarthy°' and Boykin" decisions, and
principles of consistency demand a rule of strict compliance." Nevertheless,
they find it particularly difficult to justify reversal of a conviction in a fact situa-
tion where the judge has conscientiously reviewed all of the elements required
by Rule 1 1, save one, and where that one omission obviously had no impact on
the defendant's decision to plead guilty." As illustrated by Michaelson and Saft,
in such situations the courts use various mechanisms to justify their failure to
vacate the plea while still advocating a strict compliance standard. These
methods include carving out exceptions to the rule of automatic reversal for
noncompliance95 as well as construing situations where there was not literal
compliance to be in compliance with the rule. 96
46 Id, at 1079-91.
42 Id. at 1081. Additionally, the court noted that as in Michaelson, the plea was taken
before the 	 court construed the rule. Id.
44 In United States v. Alejandro, 569 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1978), the court vacated a plea
because the judge failed to inform the defendant of the maximum special parole term that could
be imposed. The court found none of the distinguishing circumstances here which were found to
be controlling in Safi and Michaelson. Id. at 1202.
49 United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 635-36 (2d Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 635; United States v. Del Prete, 567 F.2d 928, 929-30 (9th Cir. 1978).
91 United States v. Del Prete, 567 F.2d 928, 929 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Boone, 543 F.2d 1090, 1092 (4th
Cir. 1976).
92 United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1976).
" In United States v. Carter, 619 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980), the Third Circuit used all
the rationales mentioned in the text at notes 89-93 supra in order to mandate strict compliance
with Rule 11, but stopped short of establishing a rule of automatic reversal for technical non-
compliance. The court threatened to adopt such a rule in the future, if necessary. Id. at 299.
Under the facts of the case, the plea had to be vacated even under a harmless error standard. Id.
at 299-300.
" United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944
(1978); United States v. Michaelson, 552 F.2d 472, 477 (2d Cir, 1977).
94 See text and notes at notes 79-81 supra.
96 See text and notes at notes 83-87 supra; See also United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d
1302 (9th Cir. 1978).
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As will be shown in the following section, some courts have rejected the
rule of strict compliance and automatic reversal for noncompliance. Rather
than adopting a strict rule and carving out exceptions, these courts have at-
tempted to define a standard that would not mandate reversal for technical
failures to comply with Rule 11. The next section will describe the standard
adopted in one of these courts and the difficulties inherent in this standard.
B. Fifth Circuit: Substantial Compliance
In United States v. Dayton," an en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit held that
a distinction should be made between the core requirements of the pre-
McCarthy rule — that the plea be voluntary, informed, and made with
knowledge of the consequences — and the 1975 additions to the rule." Initially
focusing on the core requirements, the Dayton court held that a total failure to
address any one of the three concerns should trigger the automatic reversal
standard set forth in McCarthy. 99 The court specified, however, that when the
three core concerns are inadequately addressed, rather than totally omitted, the
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California'°° should
be applied to determine whether the alleged deficiency merits reversal.' 0 '
Having described the two possible standards which could apply to McCar-
thy's core concerns, the Dayton court next addressed what level of review should
be applied to the post-McCarthy additions to Rule 11. When a violation involves
the post-McCarthy additions to the rule, rather than the core concerns, the court
ruled that per se reversal was not mandated.'" Rather, in such an instance, the
reviewing court should regard the judge's acceptance of the guilty plea as a
positive finding of fact on each of these Rule 11 matters. These findings should
be reviewed under the clearly erroneous rule'" and a harmless error
97 604 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1979).
98 Id. at 939. In Dayton, the defendant alleged two bases for setting aside his plea. Id. at
941. He claimed first that he was not sufficiently informed of the nature of the charges against
him and, second, that there was not a sufficient determination by the trial judge that a factual
basis for the plea existed. Id. During the guilty plea proceeding, the trial judge read the charges
contained in the two counts to which Dayton was pleading guilty. Id. In response to the judge's
questions, Dayton said that he understood the charges and had no questions. Id. Later the judge
asked the prosecuting attorney to state the facts that the government contended could be proven.
Id. at 942. Following the prosecutor's recitation of the facts, Dayton admitted that these facts
were true and could be admitted beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
99 Id. at 939.
1011 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Chapman held that there may be some constitutional errors which
do not demand automatic reversal of a conviction because, in the context of the case, the error is
so insignificant as to be deemed harmless. Id. at 22. The Court held that in order for a constitu-
tional error to be considered harmless, it must be determined by the court to be harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id, at 24. According to the Chapman Court, to meet this standard, the pros-
ecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not contribute to the
verdict. Id.
101 604 F.2d at 939.
102 Id. at 940.
in According to the Dayton court, factfindings by judges in criminal cases are addressed
in FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c). Id. at 940 n.14. This rule does not indicate the proper standard to be
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standard.'" The Dayton court reasoned that in view of the current complexity
of Rule 11, vacating a plea for a technical noncompliance that has no impact on
the voluntary and informed nature of the plea is contrary to the finality needed
in the plea procedure."5 The court further noted that to require automatic
reversal for errors in the handling of post-McCarthy additions to the rule would
be to put these requirements on a higher plane than that accorded some con-
stitutional rights. 106 Thus, the Dayton court adopted a three-tiered standard
which demands automatic reversal for failure to address the core concerns,
possible use of the Chapman standard for inadequate address of these concerns,
and a clearly erroneous and harmless error standard for errors involving post-
McCarthy additions to the rule.'"
used for reviewing these findings of fact. Yet, according to the court, it is generally agreed that
the 'clearly erroneous' test should be applied" to judge's findings in jury-waived criminal pro-
ceedings. Id. quoting 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 374, at
18 (1969). This test has the same meaning as it has in a civil case. 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAI, PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 374, at 18 (1969). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when al-
though there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 363, 395 (1948).
104 604 F.2d at 940-41. The standard which federal courts use to determine if an error,
not of constitutional dimension, is harmless is whether
the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very
slight effect . . . But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all
that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude
that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether
there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error.
It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if
one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946). Although the "harmless error" statute
construed in Kotteakos has been replaced, this view remains authoritative. Sec 3 C. WRIGHT,
FF,DERAI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 854 at 354-55 (1969 & Supp. 1980); United
States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1978).
1 " 604 F.2d at 939-40. The court found support for its distinction between technical
noncompliance with Rule 11 and involuntary pleas in Halliday v. United States. Id. at 940 citing
Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 833 (1969). In Halliday, the Supreme Court refused to
apply retroactively the McCarthy automatic reversal rule. 394 U.S. at 833.
604 F.2d at 939. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that
constitutional error could be harmless. Although a different result was required by the facts in
Chapman, the Court indicated that comment on a defendant's failure to testify could constitute
harmless error even though it was a violation of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. at 24-26. Sec Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970), in which the
Court remanded the case to the state court to determine if the denial of counsel at the preliminary
hearing was harmless error under Chapman s. California.
107 The holding in Dayton is particularly interesting because the result in the case did not
demand adoption of this standard. The defendant claimed that he was not sufficiently informed
of the nature of the charges. Id. at 941. After the indictment was read to Dayton, he was asked if
he understood it and if he had any questions. Id. the court found that in this case, the reading of
the indictment with the opportunity for questioning was sufficient explanation of the nature of
the charge. Id. at 943. There appears to have been full compliance with the language of Rule 11
in this proceeding. The result in this case could have been reached by simply overruling the
court's precedents which had demanded more than routine questions and solitary responses. See,
e.g., United States v. Lincecum, 568 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1978); Sierra v. Government of Canal
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The three-tiered standard announced in Dayton has been applied in several
later Fifth Circuit cases. In United States v. Caston, 1 °8 the defendant was not ex-
plicitly informed of his rights to have a jury trial, to be assisted by counsel, and
not to incriminate himself at trial as required by Rule 11(c)(3). He was also not
informed that his answers could later be used in a perjury prosecution against
him as demanded by Rule 11(c)(5). 1 °9 The court held that in spite of the district
court's failure to comply fully with Rule 11, the plea would not be vacated."°
In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the three core considerations
of the pre-McCarthy rule had been addressed, since, in asking the accused if he
understood that he was waiving all of his constitutional protections, the trial
judge had sufficiently determined that Caston understood the consequences of
the plea."' Because the judge had determined that the defendant understood
the waiver and the defendant did not allege that he was prejudiced by the
judge's inadequate compliance with Rule 11(c)(3), the court concluded that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not merit reversal." 2
The court also determined that the Rule 11(c)(5) omission did not merit rever-
sal because the protection provided by this subsection goes to the fairness of a
subsequent perjury conviction rather than the voluntariness of the plea.'"
Since the advice required by 11(c)(5) is not one of the core inquiries under Rule
11 and the error was not prejudicial because there was no prosecution for per-
jury, the Gaston court determined that reversal was not warranted under the
harmless error standard which applies to violations of post-McCarthy additions
to the rule." 4
In United States v. Almaguer,'" a different Fifth Circuit panel had difficulty
in applying the Dayton standard. Initially, the Almaguer court vacated the de-
fendant's plea, holding that the failure of the trial court to inform the defendant
that his answers could be used later in a perjury prosecution against him, as re-
quired by 11(c)(5), was reversible error.'" In this opinion, the court,
acknowledging a contrary decision in Gaston, reasoned that it could not con-
sider the error harmless in view of all of the facts and the failure of the trial
court to address any part of Rule 11(c)(5).'" On rehearing, the same panel
Zone, 546 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1977).
1 " 615 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980).
109 Id. at 1113-14.
110 Id. at 1116.
"' Id. at 1115.
1 " Id. at 1115-16.
'" Id. at 1116.
Id. In United States v. Law, 633 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit used the
same analysis. The court maintained that it was applying the "harmless error" standard of
review to the court's failure to give a Rule 11(c)(5) instruction and the "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard to the omission of a specific inquiry about provisions made outside
the plea bargain. Id. at 1157-58.
"5 620 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) recalled and vacated in 632 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1980).
16 620 F.2d at 559.
1 " Id. The court recognized that under Dayton it could regard the trial court's acceptance
of the plea as a positive finding on the requirement of Rule 11(c)(5), reviewable under a clearly
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recalled and vacated the first opinion and held that the 11(c)(5) violation was
not reversible error." 8 The court noted that because the warning in 11(c)(5)
was not one of the core inquiries, automatic reversal was not mandated." 8
Since Almaguer was not being prosecuted for perjury and he had not alleged
prejudice, the court determined that the error was harmless under the standard
of Chapman v. California and refused to vacate the plea. 12° The Almaguer court
did not explain the use of the Chapman constitutional standard in place of the
general "harmless error" standard suggested by Dayton for these types of errors
and used in Gaston. These attempts to apply the Dayton standard demonstrate
the courts' difficulty in properly applying the standards and in reaching consis-
tent results.
As the decisions in Almaguer and Cason make clear, the Dayton standard
creates a very cumbersome analysis, is difficult to apply, and invites inconsis-
tent results. In addition, a determination of harmlessness necessary to a
harmless error standard is somewhat speculative in the context of a guilty plea.
These difficulties, as well as those suggested in the discussion of strict com-
pliance, will be discussed in the following section. They demonstrate the inade-
quacies of the solutions articulated thus far by the courts.
III. ANALYSIS
The approaches adopted by all of the circuits, in attempting to develop
and adhere to standards for compliance with Rule 11, have had a variety of
shortcomings. In order to determine what criteria are essential to a correct
standard, this section will analyze the statutory language, legislative intent,
and purposes of the rule as well as the conflicting policy concerns involved.
Next, this section will apply these principles to the approaches utilized by the
Second and Fifth Circuits, in order to demonstrate the strengths and
weaknesses of each approach.
A. Rule 11: Language, Legislative History, and Policy
.
A reading of Rule 11 indicates that it uses clearly mandatory language.
Subsection (c) provides " [t]he court must address the defendant personally in
open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands . . . "
[emphasis added] 12 ' The language could hardly be more definitive. Further-
more, the wording was changed from the less definitive language in the Ad-
visory Committee version which provided: "The court shall not accept a plea
erroneous standard. Id. The circuit court panel addressed this by saying that in view of the
district court's failure to address Rule 11(c)(5), a finding that the defendant understood Rule
11(c)(5) would be a finding by implication which would be clearly erroneous. Id.
" 8 United States v. Almaguer, 632 F.2d 1265, 1266.67 (5th Cir. 1980).
18 Id. at 1266 citing United States v. Caston, 615 F.2d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir. 1980).
' 2° 632 F.2d at 1267.
' 21 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
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of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant per-
sonally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands
. . . "122
 This strengthening of the language of the rule in its final version
supports the view that the use of mandatory language in the rule was inten-
tional. The mandatory language combined with the decision to expand the rule
extensively rather than leave the choice of warnings to the trial judge 123 in-
dicate that the 1975 amendments were intended to impose absolute re-
quirements on the district courts and not merely to furnish direction. 124
 Thus,
one essential element of any standard adopted must be that it requires the rule
to be followed closely.
The view that strict compliance is mandated by the rule is further sup-
ported by the legislative intent behind the amendments to Rule 11. Rule 11
was amended in 1975 in order to identify, with greater specificity, what must
be explained to the defendant regarding the nature of the charge and the conse-
quences of the plea. 125 The amendments also served to codify the requirements
of Boykin v. Alabama regarding the constitutional rights which are waived by a
guilty plea.' 26 Initially, in amending Rule 11, the Advisory Committee had
considered some of the advice later included in Rule 11(c) to be optional and
suggested that the determination of what warnings are constitutionally re-
quired should be left to the development of case-law.'" Their approach,
however, was rejected in favor of mandatory language. The House Judiciary
Committee expanded and changed the language suggested by the Advisory
Committee to include the current Rule 11(c)(2) and (3) 128 because it concluded
that the warnings given to the defendant ought to include those that Boykin
mandated as constitutionally required.' 29
 This expansion reflects Congress'
' 22
 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 691, 693.
123
 All of Rule 11(c) and (d) (over 300 words) are devoted to requirements which were
disposed of in one sentence in the previous version of the rule. See text and notes at notes 40.54
supra.
'" The "clearly erroneous" and "harmless error" standards adopted by Dayton for
violations of post-McCarthy additions to the rule give a great deal of flexibility to the courts. These
standards imply that the 1975 additions were made simply to furnish direction to the courts. It
thus appears to be contrary to the language of the statute.
125 1975 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 1418; Sec also Conference Committee
.Notes, H.R. REP. NO. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. Com; CoNG. &
AD. NEWS 714.
126 1975 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 1418.
122 1975 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 1418-19.
In explaining to a defendant that he waives his right to trial, the judge may want to
explain some of the aspects of trial such as the right to confront witnesses, to sub-
poena witnesses, to testify in his own behalf, or, if he chooses, not to testify. What
is required, in this respect, to conform to Boykin is left to future case-law develop-
ment.
Id.
126
 See text of rule at note 41 supra.
'" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 679. Unlike the approach suggested by the Ad-
visory Committee, see note 127, supra, Congress chose not to leave to future case law develop-
ment the question of what protections were required. Instead, Congress added these sections to
the rule.
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belief that the particular warnings in these sections are required by Boykin, and
suggests that the explicit list in the rule must be followed.
The addition of Rule 11(c)(5) 13° to the 1975 amendment also supports the
notion that Congress intended that its requirements be closely followed. The
House Judiciary Committee added the warning that if the defendant answers
questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his
answers may be used against him in a later perjury tria1. 131
 The Committee
added this provision to the rule, as amended by the Court, as a result of the
change it made to 11(e)(6) 132 to permit the use of the statements made in a plea
proceeding in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.'" The Committee
recognized that the subsequent use of the statements made during plea pro-
ceedings might discourage defendants from being completely candid during
plea negotiations and might hamper some plea agreements. 134 Because the
potential prosecution could be a factor in a defendant's decision with respect to
his plea, the Committee felt that it was only fair to give the warning contained
in 11(c)(5). 135 The recognition that justice required this warning since it could
significantly affect the defendant's plea decision indicates that the Committee
considered the requirement to be mandatory.
In short, both the language of the rule and the congressional intent behind
the specific amendments indicate that close adherence to Rule 11 is required.
This requirement can also be inferred from Congress' decision to revise Rule
11 without adding any qualifiers, even though it was aware that McCarthy had
required strict compliance with Rule 11.' 3° Thus, strict adherence to the pro-
cedures in Rule 11 is an essential element of a proper standard of compliance
with the rule. What must be determined now is the effect of noncompliance
with the rule.
There is some support in a recent Supreme Court case for the view that per
se reversal of a conviction is required for even a technical violation of Rule 11.
In United States v. Timmreck, 137
 the Court held that a conviction based on a
guilty plea is not subject to collateral attack when all that is shown is a failure to
' 3° See text of rule at note 41, supra.
13 ' HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 691, 693.
'" The relevant portion of Fed. R. Grim. P. 11(e)(6) which was then in effect provided:
However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a
plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or an offer to plead guil-
ty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, is admissible in a
criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the
defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
Rule 11(e)(6) was amended effective December 1, 1980, but the language did not materially
change with respect to this issue. Sec 18 U.S.C. app. 1664-65 (Supp. III 1979).
1 " HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 679.
' 3' Id.
135 Id.
In
 In view of this, the Dayton distinction between the core concerns of the pre-McCarthy
rule and the post-McCarthy additions appears to be contrary to legislative intent. Considering the
clarity of the McCarthy holding, if the applicability of McCarthy were intended to differ for different
portions of the rule, a distinction could have been made by Congress when amending the rule.
'" 441 U.S. 780 (1979).
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comply with the formal requirements of Rule 11. 138 Some of the language in
Timmreck139
 hints that a strictly technical violation would demand reversal on
direct appeal. This language is not dispositive, however." -°
A number of policy considerations also strongly support automatic rever-
sal for a failure to comply strictly with Rule 11. Both Congress and the courts
have been concerned with insuring that defendants' rights are consistently
safeguarded while preserving the finality of the plea procedure. A rule of strict
compliance and per se reversal best balances these conflicting concerns. Such a
rule insures that a defendant's rights are protected in a uniform manner in all
of the courts and encourages district court judges to adhere consistently to the
rule. Vague standards of compliance do not adequately insure that defendants'
rights are safeguarded routinely because these standards contribute to results
which differ not on the basis of the merits of the case but on the particular panel
or court considering the issue. 141
 In addition, as clearly articulated in McCarthy,
strict adherence to Rule 11 creates a record that will more easily defeat a later
collateral attack on voluntariness, and thus preserve the finality of the plea pro-
cedure. 142
It is true, of course, that the benefits of a strict rule of compliance and
automatic reversal must be balanced against the burdens such a rule places on
the judicial system. The burdens which result from strict compliance and
automatic reversal, however, are relatively slight as long as the standard is not
unequivocally literal. One burden that must be considered in a discussion of
reversing.criminal convictions is the potential for freeing numerous factually
guilty defendants. Yet, it would be extraordinarily rare for reversal for non-
compliance with Rule 11 to result in freeing a defendant since, following rever-
sal, each case would be remanded for a new plea. On direct appeal, little time
would have elapsed 143 so that evidence or witnesses necessary to a conviction
would still be available if the defendant were to enter a new plea of not guilty
and a trial were held. Nonetheless, there would be situations where the original
plea took place halfway through the defendant's trial or during a trial for
several co-defendants which has subsequently been completed. In these cases,
13U Id. at 785.
199
 "His only claim is of a technical violation of the rule. That claim could have been
raised on direct appeal [citation omitted] but was not."
Id. at 784.
'" A contrary reading is also possible. McCarthy held that a Rule 11 error is inherently
prejudicial. The failure to reverse the conviction in Timmreck may be viewed as deciding that a
technical violation of the rule is not prejudicial. Timmreck may therefore be viewed as a weakening
of the McCarthy position.
14 ' See text and notes at notes 150-51 infra.
14 ' 394 U.S. at 467. See text and notes at 31-33 supra.
"9
 Notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed within 10 days of the entry of judg-
ment. This time limit may be extended by 30 days on a showing of excusable neglect. FED. R.
APP. P. 4(b). A defendant may also make a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32(d). This motion must normally be made before sentencing. Only in order to correct
manifest injustice may withdrawal be allowed after sentencing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
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the government's additional burden would be the costs of duplicate trials and
the associated difficulties in obtaining evidence and witnesses. Thus, the
burden created by a per se reversal rule is the additional cost to the government
that will result from repeated plea negotiations, plea proceedings, and trials
rather than the more substantial burden of freeing massive numbers of defend-
ants on technical grounds.'"
Another burden to be considered is that by requiring a judge to follow the
rule closely or be in error, a strict standard may initially create the potential for
many frivolous appeals. Any increase in such appeals which might be en-
couraged at first by a strict rule of compliance, however, should diminish with
time. The increase in district court compliance which should inevitably result
will eventually reduce the number of appeals on these grounds. Furthermore,
increased compliance with the rule will reduce the number of and simplify
many of the remaining collateral attacks on voluntariness. This would suggest
that the long term effect would be to diminish the burden on the judicial
system.
A final burden which must be confronted in evaluating a rule of strict
compliance and automatic reversal is the impact that unwavering literal com-
pliance has on the integrity of the judicial system. In those few courts which do
not comply totally with the rule, there may be occasional instances where
reversal is mandated by a literal rule but which produces such absurd results
that the entire process appears extreme. A standard to be applied by the courts
should thus avoid, to the extent possible, results which are removed from reali-
ty and which create questions about the validity of courts' decisions.
An ideal standard would incorporate all of the characteristics discussed
above. The language of the rule, the legislative intent in the 1975 amendments,
McCarthy, Timmreck, and policy considerations all suggest strict adherence to
the rule and automatic reversal for noncompliance. The standard must,
however, attempt to avoid unreasonable results following from technical omis-
sions in order to avoid a loss of credibility for the courts.
B. Second and Fifth Circuit Approaches Evaluated
Having identified the necessary components of a proper standard, this sec-
tion will use these factors to evaluate the approaches used by the Second and
144 An issue has been raised as to whether the government may prosecute on the original
charges after a defendant succeeds in obtaining reversal of a guilty plea. All of the courts which
have considered the issue have determined that the bar against double jeopardy does not prevent
the government from prosecuting on the original charges after a defendant has succeeded in set-
ting aside a guilty plea to a lesser included offense. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1506 (5th ed. 1980) and Fall 1980 Supp. 93 [hereinafter cited
as KAMISAR AND LAFAVE]. See, e.g., Hawk v. Berkemer, 610 F. 2d 445 (6th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Williams, 534, F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583 (7th
Cir. 1975); Commonwealth v. Therrien, 359 Mass. 500, 269 N.E. 2d 687 (1971). In People v.
McMiller, 389 Mich. 425, 208 N.W.2d 451 (1973), however, the court decided "that upon the
acceptance of a plea of guilty, as a ?natter of policy, the state may not thereafter charge a higher of-
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Fifth Circuits. Initially, it is evident that the Second Circuit articulated a
standard of strict compliance and per se reversal for noncompliance which cor-
rectly embraces the language and intent of Rule 11, the dictates of McCarthy
and Boykin, and significant policy considerations. 145 This circuit, however, has
been confronted with particular fact situations in which it was difficult to ad-
here to this standard as articulated. Rather than changing its standard, the
Second Circuit has chosen to carve out exceptions and to adjust its definition of
compliance on a case-by-case basis in order to achieve desired results. 16 The
court definitively rejected a harmless error standard in Journet, yet arguably
used such a standard in Michaelson"' and Saft 148 because it was difficult to
justify reversal when the error had no impact on the defendant's decision to
plead guilty and the judge had reviewed all of the other elements of Rule 11.
Thus the Second Circuit adopted a rule which articulated an appropriate
standard in light of the rule, the legislative intent, and the Supreme Court deci-
sions. The court did not, however, weave into its standard a rule of reason
which would enable it to decide cases on a consistent and principled basis. In-
stead, in order to arrive at reasonable decisions, it chose to make decisions on a
case-by-case basis.
In an attempt to establish a standard which would not demand automatic
reversal in cases of technical noncompliance with the rule, other circuits
adopted standards of substantial compliance. It is apparent, however, that
these standards conflict with the language of the current rule, the legislative in-
tent behind the amendments to Rule 11, and the dictates of McCarthy, all of
which suggest a rule of strict compliance and automatic reversal. Furthermore,
the ambiguity of these standards creates important practical problems. For ex-
ample, in order to apply the three-tiered standard of Dayton, it is first necessary
to distinguish between pre-McCarthy core concerns and post-McCarthy additions
to the rule. This determination, in itself, is ambiguous since arguably all of the
post-McCarthy additions relate to the issues of voluntariness, informed plea, or
the consequences of the plea, all of which were the concerns of the pre-McCarthy
rule. Additionally, it is not clear at what point a failure to address one element
of one subsection becomes a "failure" to address one of the core concerns and
when it is an "inadequate" address of the core concerns. Assuming the ele-
ment of the rule can be characterized, the appropriate standard is then applied
to determine the effect of noncompliance. While the court suggests three dif-
ferent standards for the three categories, 149 it fails to describe how these stand-
ards would operate. The Dayton standard is therefore very ambiguous and
cumbersome to apply.
fense arising out of the same transaction." [emphasis added] Id. at 434, 208 N.W.2d at 454.
145 See text and notes at notes 69-76 supra. See also United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d
-633 (2d Cir. 1976).
146 See text and notes at notes 94-96 supra.
' 47 See text and notes at note 82 supra.
146 See text following note 87 supra.
149 These standards are: automatic reversal for failure to address the pre-McCarthy core
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The vagueness of the Fifth Circuit standard, like that of other substantial
compliance standards, lends itself to inconsistent application since it can be in-
terpreted differently by different courts.' 50 In addition, the determinations
under substantial compliance standards rely on factual, subjective, case-by-
case determinations which create the opportunity for nonuniform results.'" It
is significant that the per se reversal rule of McCarthy was created in order to ob-
viate the need for similar subjective determinations. The McCarthy Court noted
that there is not a good substitute for demonstrating on the record when the
defendant enters the plea that the requirements of the rule are met.'"
Another difficulty inherent in the Dayton standard is the speculative nature
of a harmless error standard in the context of a guilty plea. For example, the
Caston and Almaguer courts concluded that the failure to inform the defendants
of the potential for perjury prosecution was harmless since they were not being
prosecuted for perjury. Nevertheless, merely because a defendant has not been
charged with perjury by the time that he attempts to vacate his plea does not
mean that he could not be charged at some time in the future.'" In addition,
the defendant's lack of information may have influenced his decision to plead
guilty. It is impossible to assess with accuracy the considerations which in-
fluence a defendant in his determination to enter a guilty plea. Certainly, it is
tenuous to hinge reversal on a defendant's allegation that he would not have
pleaded guilty had he known that he would be questioned or that his answers
could be used in a perjury prosecution. As the Court noted in McCarthy, any at-
tempt to determine if a defendant's plea would otherwise have been different is
concerns; possible use of the Chapman standard for inadequate addresses of these concerns; clear-
ly erroneous and harmless error standards for district court's acceptance of plea following a viola-
tion of a post-McCarthy addition to the rule. See text and notes at notes 97-107 supra.
15° The experience in Illinois is indicative of the difficulties of a substantial compliance
approach. Note, Pleading Guilty: Illinois Supreme Court Rule 902 and the New Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11, 1975 U. OF ILL. L. F. 116, 131 [hereinafter cited as Note, Pleading Guilty]. Illinois
Rule 402 is comparable to Fed. Rule 11. Supreme Court Rules, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 110A S 402
(1976). The language of the rule specifies that substantial compliance is required. The vagueness
of the standard has resulted in inconsistent decisions. Note, Pleading Guilty at 131. Some of the Il-
linois courts have interpreted substantial compliance to allow total noncompliance with one pro-
vision while other courts require at least partial compliance with every provision. Id. at 131-32.
151 On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit has remedied the inconsistencies between its original
decision in Almaguer and its decision in Caston. See text and notes at notes 115-20 supra. The prob-
lems that led to the original conflicting results, however, have not been remedied. Certainly, the
Almaguer opinions are not illuminating as to the reasons for the original conflicting results, the
reasons for the change, or the situations which might justify reversal.
"2 394 U.S. at 469-70.
` Si In United States v. Timmreck, the Court held that a conviction based on a guilty plea is
not subject to collateral attack when the only violation that is shown is a failure to comply with the
formal requirements of Rule 11. 441 U.S. 780, 784-85 (1979). Under this holding, if a defendant
were prosecuted for perjury after he could no longer directly appeal an 11(c)(5) violation, this
omission would clearly not have been harmless, yet the defendant may have no means of obtain-
ing relief. It has been suggested that if the government later attempts to prosecute a defendant for
perjury, he would be entitled to assert the failure to warn as a bar to prosecution. See United
States v. Conrad, 598 F.2d 506, 509 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979).
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highly speculative.'" Moreover, the Dayton court seemed to adopt the
"harmless error" standard and the Chapman "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard for different violations. It did not, however, distinguish how
these would be applied in the context of a guilty plea. In fact, it appears that
although the Gaston court seemed to distinguish the standards, the Almaguer
court seemed to use them interchangeably. As a result, the standards to be used
and their intended application remains unclear.
Finally, not only will the Dayton standard be interpreted inconsistently,
but it will fail to serve as a deterrent to lax application of Rule 11 in the district
courts. In this area, the courts have a unique ability to effect change since they
are directly monitoring the compliance of the lower courts.'" A vague standard
will not encourage compliance and will probably result in a decrease in com-
pliance and a resulting increase in direct appeals and collateral attacks on
voluntariness.
In summary, it is apparent that the strict compliance, automatic reversal
standard conforms to the dictates of McCarthy, the intent of the amendments,
and the policies which will insure proper application of the rule. Nevertheless,
the standard itself provides no mechanism for differentiating any of the unique
technical errors which can occur in a guilty plea proceeding. As a result, courts
have made exceptions on a case-by-case basis. In an effort to avoid reversal of
convictions in cases of technical error, other courts have adopted substantial
compliance standards. These courts, however, have created ambiguous stand-
ards which fail to adhere to McCarthy or the intent and policies behind the rule.
Some resolution of the problem presented by the 1975 amendments is
necessary. There are a variety of potential solutions that can be adopted. One
alternative is the approach suggested in the draft amendment to Rule 11 which
has been proposed by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules. 156 As will
be demonstrated in the following section, this approach has several shortcom-
ings. In the final section of this article, an alternative standard will be
presented which contains all of the elements suggested above as critical to an
optimal approach. This standard can be used presently by the courts and also
can be adopted as an amendment to Rule 11..
'" 394 U.S. at 471.
' 36
 This can be distinguished from the attempts the courts have made using the exclu-
sionary rule to deter police activity that violates the fourth amendment. It has been suggested
that the exclusionary rule is not an effective mechanism to deter illegal police conduct because the
exclusion of evidence usually has no direct impact on the officer involved. See Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 498-500 (1976) (Burger, J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415-18 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting). In the context of compliance with
Rule 11, the appellate courts are in an optimal position to affect conduct. The impact on district
court judges of reversal for failure to comply with the rule would be direct and effective.
"6
 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of thejudicial Conference of the United States [hereinafter cited as Pro-
posed Amendments], November 1, 1979.
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IV. DRAFT AMENDMENT TO RULE 11
One attempt to address the problem presented by the 1975 amendments
has been made by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules. This Commit-
tee has drafted a number of changes to Rule 11, including the addition of
subsection 11(h).' 57
(h) HARMLESS ERROR. Any variance from the procedures re-
quired by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.
This subsection tries to address the problem that has confronted the courts by
applying the Rule 52(a)' 58 harmless error standard to Rule 11.
The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the proposed draft explain
the reasons for recommending adoption of subsection (h). The Committee con-
tends that the McCarthy per se reversal standard is not appropriate to the current
version of the rule.'" They point out that McCarthy dealt with the simple,
shorter pre-1975 version of the rule and since the rule has been significantly ex-
panded, the chances of a truly harmless error are much greater in the current
versioni 6° Furthermore, the Committee reasons that the extensiveness of the
current procedure underlines the solemnity of the act of pleading guilty and a
plea should therefore not be overturned for a mere technical violation of the
rule.' 61
Next, the Committee contends that the Court in McCarthy was primarily
concerned with cases on collateral attack. Since in Timmreck the Court held that
collateral relief is not available for technical violations of Rule 11, the Commit-
tee determined that the reasoning underlying McCarthy is weakened. t62 Finally,
the Committee points out that the interest in finality has special force with
respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.'" Liberal rules allowing guilty
pleas to be vacated have a significant impact on the integrity of the judicial pro-
cedures because the great majority of convictions result from guilty pleas.'"
According to this view, only rarely does a petition to set aside a guilty plea raise
the concern that an innocent defendant may have been convicted as a result of
L" Id. at 4-5. Other proposed changes to Rule 11 include (1) addition of the option to
make conditional pleas (11(a)(2)); (2) specific mention of special parole term as part of the max-
imum possible penalty notification in 11(c)(1); (3) clarification of the wording in 11(c)(4); and (4)
changes in the wording of 11(c)(5) which clarify that the warning is only required if the defendant
is questioned under oath. Id.
"" FED. R. GRIM. P. 52(a) provides: "HARMLESS ERROR. Any error, defect, ir-
regularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." This stand-
ard was established by Congress in 28 U.S.C. 2111 (1976).
159 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 156, at 20.
160 Id.
161 Id.
' 62 Id. at 20-21.
163 Id. at 19-20 quoting United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979).
164 Id.
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unfair procedures. 165 Thus, the Committee concluded that though the interest
in finality is not as great in a direct appeal as in a collateral attack, it is suffi-
cient to require a harmless error standard.' 66
None of these rationales for the harmless error rule are entirely convinc-
ing. With respect to the first proffered rationale, simply because the current
rule is explicit and detailed, it would seem to be easier for a judge to comply
fully with this rule than with the pre-amendment rule.' 67 Certainly, the lack of
specificity in the earlier rule led to repeated errors, many of which were
harmless. It was the question of how to handle these errors which was the sub-
ject of the decision in McCarthy and the vagueness of the old rule which led to
the expansion of the rule giving less flexibility to the courts. Thus, there ap-
pears to be little, if any, justification for claiming that the chance of harmless
error is greater under the 1975 amendments. There is also no reason to believe
that the extensiveness of the post-1975 procedure increases the solemnity of the
act of pleading guilty. The view of a plea as a grave and solemn act undoubted-
ly was as strong when McCarthy was decided as it is today. Moreover, it is the
consequences of a guilty plea which make the proceeding a solemn occasion. It
is therefore more reasonable to view the solemnity of the act as weighing in
favor of vacating pleas for all errors in procedure.
The Committee's further claim that McCarthy's reasoning has been
weakened by Timmreck suggests that the Committee misread McCarthy's con-
cern with collateral attacks. McCarthy established a prophylactic rule of per se
reverse' in order to insure that there would be strict compliance with Rule 11
would, in turn, minimize the number of later collateral attacks on volun-
tariness. This rationale is not undercut by Timmreck which held that collateral
relief is not available for strictly technical violations of Rule 11. A collateral at-
tack, like that in Timmreck, may be made years after a plea is entered. If a plea
were to be vacated as the result of a collateral attack, it might be impossible to
conduct a trial because of unavailable witnesses and destroyed evidence. This
concern with the need for finality of a guilty plea which is sufficient to justify
the limitation on collateral relief in Timmreck' 68 is far less significant in a direct
appeal which occurs within a short time period.' 69
Finally, the Committee contends that the interest in finality is sufficient to
justify a harmless error standard. Though the Committee mentions the reasons
for viewing the finality interests in this context as significant, it fails to justify its
assertion that the finality considerations are sufficient to require a harmless er-
I" Id.
166
 Id. at 20.
167
 For 11(c)(2) through (5), a prepared speech, used in each plea proceeding, would in-
sure compliance. Only 11(c)(1) demands a somewhat individualized speech. A judge could use a
checklist to make sure that he missed nothing. Sec United States v. Carter, 619 F.2d 293, 299
(1980).
168 United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784-85 (1979); See also Henderson v.
Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 n.13 (1977); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
169 See note 143 supra.
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ror standard. As indicated earlier,"° the prejudice to the government in a case
on direct appeal does not outweigh the benefits of a per se reversal rule. Though
there might be some initial increases in costs resulting from repeated plea pro-
ceedings, the long term effect would undoubtedly be an increase in compliance
with the rule, thus preserving the finality of guilty pleas. Furthermore, strict
compliance would create adequate records which would help defeat subsequent
collateral attacks while insuring that defendant's rights are consistently pro-
tected. The statement in the Advisory Committee Notes that subdivision (h)
should not encourage judges to handle Rule 11 proceedings more casually"' is
an admirable concern. Unfortunately the change to a harmless error standard
will probably create just that result.
The Advisory Committee Notes also include illustrations of those viola-
tions of the rule which would and would not be harmless error.'" Those in-
cluded as examples of harmless error are the cases where the determination of
harmlessness is uncomplicated and the result would be the same under a
stricter standard. For instance, the Committee suggests that when a judge does
not mention some essential element of a crime but the defendant's response in-
dicates that he understands that the element was involved in the crime, the
judge's error would be harmless. 173 The Committee also states that the
harmless error standard under subsection (h) does not encompass extreme or
speculative claims of harmless error as in a case where a trial judge totally ab-
dicates responsibility to the prosecutor for giving warnings."' The Committee
does not, however, give direction for handling the cases that are not clear-cut.
For example, the Committee does not address whether it is harmless error for
the judge to omit one or two rights from the list of constitutional rights waived
if the defendant does not allege that this failure had any impact on his plea.
By ignoring some of the more difficult examples, the Committee failed to
define adequately the meaning of the harmless error standard in the context of
a guilty plea. The standard recommended by the Committee is: any variance
"which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." It is not clear,
however, what type of variance would be considered to affect substantial
rights. The Committee Notes make reference to circuit court decisions that
viewed as harmless any variance which "could not have had any impact on the
defendant's decision to plead or the fairness in now holding him to his plea."'"
The Committee does not clarify, however, whether this is the test that will be
used and what the result would be of a failure to give one of the warnings in
subsections (2), (3) or (4) under such a test. The determination of whether a
defendant would have chosen to plead guilty, had he known, is itself inor-
1 " See text accompanying and following notes 140-44 supra.
'n See Proposed Amendment, supra note 156, at 22.
172 Id, at 21-22.
1 " Id.
' 74 Id. at 21.
13 Id. at 18. See, e.g. , United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1977).
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dinately speculative. In addition, even though there may have been no impact
on a defendant's decision to plead guilty, the waiver of a constitutional right
alone might warrant reversal. To be valid under the due process clause, a
waiver "must be 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege.' " 176 Thus, a guilty plea made without the required warn-
ings would constitute an unknowing waiver which would require reversal.
The failure to define "harmless error" in the context of a guilty plea
creates the potential for inconsistent application of the new standard among
and within circuits. It also creates the opportunity for courts to manipulate the
standard to achieve desired results in particular fact situations. In summary,
adoption of this harmless error standard would ignore the essentially pro-
phylactic purpose of Rule 11)" As articulated in McCarthy, strict compliance
with the rule is necessary in order to obviate the need for later voluntariness
determinations. The choice to reject a harmless error standard may produce
some cases where a conviction is vacated without the defendant having been
prejudiced. Nevertheless, it would guarantee that relief is granted in all cases of
prejudice without imposing an undue burden on the government. The next
section will propose a workable standard that can be used in place of the
harmless error standard. First, the section will show how the proposed stand-
ard can be used currently by the courts, incorporating all of the necessary
criteria discussed in section III. The latter part of the section will suggest inclu-
sion of this proposed standard into Rule 11 as a substitute for 11(h) as currently
proposed.
V. RECOMMENDED STANDARD
Until Rule 11 is amended to include a standard, the courts must continue
to confront the problem of what constitutes compliance and what should be the
appropriate remedy for noncompliance with the rule as currently written. They
must adopt an approach which carries out the intent of McCarthy and the 1975
amendments and which conforms to the policy behind the rule. The standard
that the courts use must also be one which can be adhered to consistently
without unduly burdening the court system. In addition, care must be taken to
distinguish between what constitutes compliance with Rule 11 and what the
remedy is for noncompliance with the rule.
It is submitted that courts should adopt an approach which will be labelled
a "strict in context" approach. Basically, this approach would demand strict
adherence to the requirements of Rule II and automatic reversal for non-
compliance. It would, however, require that the determination of whether
there was compliance with the rule be made in the context of the record and the
16 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
'" A similar criticism has been advanced regarding the use of the harmless error stand-
ard in Miranda type situations. See KAMISAR AND LAFAVE, supra note 144, at 817.
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posture of the case at the guilty plea proceeding. The only permissible devia-
tions from requiring that the judge personally address each element of the rule
would be (1) those situations where the defendant indicates on the record his
understanding of the omitted advice and (2) those situations where, based on
the posture of the case, any defendant had to have understood the rights being
waived.
This recommended approach incorporates all of the elements suggested as
necessary to an ideal standard. First, strict adherence_ to Rule 11 must be re-
quired in order to prevent ambiguity and to provide consistency. The
vagueness of a standard requiring only substantial compliance with the rule
contributes to inconsistent decisions, a lack of predictability, and complexity in
reviewing records. Moreover, it is not clear whether there is substantial com-
pliance if the judge completely fails to address one provision or if he partially
complies with all provisions without fully complying with every one. 1 " Requir-
ing strict compliance with the rule will insure that district court judges under-
stand what is demanded by the rule and will encourage careful and automatic
adherence to its requirements.'"
The second element of the recommended standard is that the context of
the situation may be used in determining if there was compliance with the rule.
This allows the court to conclude that the rule was complied with when the
defendant's responses during the guilty plea proceeding indicate, on the
record, his understanding of the specific Rule 11 subsection involved. It also
enables the court to consider the posture of the case and determine if, based on
the record, it would be impossible for the defendant to be unaware of the ele-
ment of Rule 11 which the judge failed to mention. This "strict in context" ap-
proach addresses many of the situations which are often used to illustrate the
absurdity of demanding literal compliance with the rule. For example, Rule 11
would be considered to be complied with when a defendant with appointed
counsel pleads guilty in the middle of trial, even if the judge does not specifical-
ly advise him of his right to counsel at trial as required by Rule 11(c)(3).
This proposed standard does not allow for a determination of compliance
to be based in any way on what the defendant actually knew or ought to have
known, or on the absence of prejudice to the defendant. Under this standard,
175 See text and note at note 150 supra.
"9 Though an appellate court would undoubtedly want to indicate to the lower courts
what it considered optimal compliance with the rule, this must be distinguished from the conduct
necessary to comply with the existing rule. For example, a court may consider it optimal for the
district court judge to have an extensive dialogue with the defendant regarding the nature of the
charge in which the judge informs the defendant of all of the elements of the charge, the relation-
ship of the law to the facts, the acts that must be proven to establish guilt, and possible affirmative
defenses. In this dialogue, the defendant optimally would give more of an indication of
understanding than a solitary response that he understands. The court might expect that the
judge adjust his approach depending on the sophistication of the defendant and the complexity of
the charge. There will be many cases, however, where the reading of the indictment with a single
question to the defendant as to his understanding of the charge will suffice to comply with the
rule.
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therefore, there would have been a failure to comply with Rule 11 in Michael-
son. In that case, the court concluded that the defendant must have known his
right not to incriminate himself partly because it was "highly unlikely" that his
competent attorney would not have so advised him.'" Furthermore, the court
determined that the defendant's plea of guilty did not result from a belief that
he would be forced to incriminate himself.lal The assessment of what the de-
fendant must have known or what influenced his decision to plead guilty would
not be relevant under the proposed standard. Since the trial judge in Michaelson
failed to inform the defendant that he could not be compelled to incriminate
himself and since the possibility exists that the defendant could have been
unaware of this right, there was noncompliance with Rule 11. Using this ap-
proach, it is possible to develop a reasonable solution for most of the problem
situations confronted by the courts.'" The "strict in context" approach avoids
the need to carve out exceptions to the rule of strict compliance on a case-by-
case basis. Complicated factual determinations for each case which the McCar-
thy rule was designed to prevent are also avoided with this approach. It pro-
vides a standard which increases predictability and uniformity of application
while encouraging consistent and complete adherence to the rule by trial court
judges.
Finally, under this standard the judicial remedy for a failure to comply
with Rule 11 should be automatic reversal. Not only would such a rule conform
most closely to the dictates of McCarthy and the legislative intent in amending
the rule, but it would strengthen the consistency of the rule's application. Par-
ticularly in the context of judicial compliance with a rule, the courts are in a
unique position to affect compliance. 183 The approach of requiring strict com-
pliance, with reversal for all instances of noncompliance, most effectively ad-
vances the important policy considerations inherent in the rule. Automatic
reversal will insure uniform procedures for accepting pleas and greater con-
sistency, predictability, and accuracy in reviewing the requests for reversal. It
' 8° 552 F.2d at 477.
181 Id.
182 Using this standard, some examples would be handled as follows: (a) Failure to give
an 11(c)(5) warning regarding potential prosecution for perjury to a person questioned under
oath, as in Gaston and Alruagucr, would constitute noncompliance with Rule 11. The language of
the rule is clear and the context would not affect the defendant's awareness of a potential future
perjury prosecution. The lack of prejudice to the defendant in not receiving the warning is irrele-
vant under this standard. (b) When a defendant is not placed under oath, an omission of an
11(c)(5) warning regarding potential prosecution for perjury would not constitute noncompliance
with Rule 11. The language of 11(c)(5) can be interpreted as not requiring this warning where no
oath is administered. The Advisory Committee has proposed a change to the wording of 11(c)(5)
which, if adopted, would completely eliminate this problem. Proposed Amendments, supra note 156,
at 5. (c) There would be compliance with Rule 11 when a defendant, pleading guilty in the mid-
dle of a jury trial, is not informed that he has a right to a jury trial as required by Rule 11(c)(3)
since based on the posture of the case, the defendant could not be unaware of the right being
waived.
' 88 See text and note at note 155 supra.
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will insure that later collateral attacks as to the voluntariness of the plea will be
able to be disposed of more efficiently and that the defendant's rights are con-
sistently safeguarded. The additional costs to the criminal justice system that
this standard would generate in direct appeal cases are minimal when com-
pared to the benefits to be gained.
The "strict in context" standard can be used immediately by the courts
since it follows the mandate of McCarthy, the intent of the rule, and the policies
behind the rule. Nevertheless, a standard incorporated into the rule would
resolve the conflict among the circuits regarding the proper standard to be
used. In light of all of the above considerations, the following substitute for the
proposed Rule 11(h) should be considered:
(h) COMPLIANCE. There must be strict adherence to the pro-
cedures required by this rule. Nevertheless, if,
(1) based on the posture of the case, a warning could have no
relevance to the defendant or the defendant could not be
unaware of the right being waived or
(2) the defendant indicates by his response that he understands
that he is waiving a right,
failure by the judge to personally inform him will not constitute
noncompliance. On direct appeal, noncompliance will result in
automatic reversal. On collateral attack, a harmless error stand-
ard will apply.
This approach resolves some of the problems most frequently cited in
criticism of the automatic reversal rule. In a few instances, new plea pro-
ceedings and even trials may be granted to individuals who were not actually
prejudiced by the error. Overall, however, this strict approach will improve
uniformity and consistency in the application of the rule. As the Court so aptly
stated in McCarthy:
It is, therefore, not too much to require that, before sentencing
defendants to years of imprisonment, district judges take the few
minutes necessary to inform them of their rights and to determine
whether they understand the action they are taking)"
CONCLUSION
A judicial standard of compliance and review for Rule 11 must follow the
dictates of McCarthy and the language and intent of Rule 11 as amended in
1975. Both legislative and judicial standards must also insure that defendants'
pleas are informed, voluntary, and entered with knowledge of the rights being
waived and the consequences of the plea. The rule must encourage consistent
adherence to its requirements without burdening the integrity of the judicial
181
 394 U.S. at 472.
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system with unreasonable results reached under the rubric of literal com-
pliance. The "strict in context" standard proposed in this note effectively in-
corporates these elements into a rational rule which will insure predictable and
principled decisions while encouraging consistent adherence to Rule 11 by trial
court judges.
EDITH A. GOLDMAN
